

**Protecting the Homeland at the Local Level: An
Assessment of Local Law Enforcement Antiterrorism
Programs in North Carolina**

**John M. Newton
East Carolina University**

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 01 SEP 2004		2. REPORT TYPE N/A		3. DATES COVERED -	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Protecting the Homeland at the Local Level: An Assessment of Local Law Enforcement Antiterrorism Programs in North Carolina				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) East Carolina University				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 63	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

PROFESSIONAL PAPER

The Professional Paper of John M. Newton, is prepared for Criminal Justice Studies, East Carolina University, under the title of:

Protecting the Homeland at the Local Level: An Assessment of Local Law Enforcement Antiterrorism Programs in North Carolina

is approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Science in Criminal Justice Degree.

Date: _____

Chairperson

Committee Member

“The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.”

Abstract

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, local law enforcement agencies have attempted to formulate their antiterrorism programs with the intention of accomplishing the objectives outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. These agencies turn to their respective state and federal government for support and guidance. Therefore, this paper examines the history of the federal government's homeland security initiatives and the various resources local law enforcement agencies utilize in order to structure their programs. In addition, this paper reviews ten North Carolina local law enforcement agencies' antiterrorism programs revealing their association with the National Strategy for Homeland Security while at the same time, measuring the amount of support provided to these programs by the higher levels of government.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Section 1. Literature Review.....	4
Federal Homeland Security Evolution	4
National Strategy for Homeland Security.....	10
Creating Effective Antiterrorism Programs at the Local Level.....	13
Section 2. Methods.....	24
Research Sample.....	24
Data Gathering.....	27
Data Analysis.....	28
Section 3. Findings.....	29
Research Sample General Information.....	29
Program Administration.....	30
Training and Exercises.....	36
Intelligence Gathering and Information Sharing.....	39
Daily Operations.....	42
Federal and State Support.....	45
Section 4. Recommendations for Future Antiterrorism Program Research.....	47
Section 5. Conclusion.....	48
References.....	49
Appendixes.....	55
Appendix 1. Informed Consent Form.....	55
Appendix 2. Interview Outline.....	57

Introduction

The history of combating terrorism on the U.S. homeland did not begin on September 11, 2001. Well before that date, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) were faced with responding to terrorist attacks carried out by both domestic and international terrorists.¹ Some of these terrorists were members of well established organizations while others were simply lone wolves seeking to gain attention for their particular cause. Some terrorists targeted specific individuals, others hijacked planes, while others bombed buildings (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation [CACNP], n.d.).

As time passed though, terrorists began to expand their repertoire of potential targets on the homeland. Adding to specific individuals, airplanes and buildings, terrorists began to target government or business computer systems to destroy files or shut down entire networks. Other terrorists sought to poison water supplies or infect people with biological organisms or toxic substances. Some terrorists planned to destroy items of National significance to include monuments and historical sites. While others favored attacking the infrastructure of the Nation's densely populated areas, to include electrical systems, nuclear power plants, transportation systems, waterways and bridges. The current list of potential terrorist targets and the methods of attack seem endless.

In an attempt to deal with the increasing threat of terrorism, federal, state and local LEAs enhanced their antiterrorism programs while government administrators took steps to strengthen

¹ According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) at <http://baltimore.fbi.gov/domter.htm>, terrorism is classified as "either domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorist organization. "Domestic terrorism" involves "groups or individuals who are based and operate entirely within the United States and Puerto Rico without foreign direction and whose violent acts are directed at elements of the U.S. Government or population."

the Nation's homeland security by passing legislation along the way. However, before September 11, 2001, these actions seemed to only provide a:

steady low-key interest in terrorism, leading to piecemeal measures, congressional commissions, and an occasional academic conference, but terrorism failed to capture the public's attention or sustain high-level government interest until the unimaginable happened. (Kayyem & Pangi, 2003, p.1)

Since the deadly attacks of September 11, 2001, LEAs at all levels of government have diligently constructed antiterrorism programs with the main objective of stopping another attack on the homeland. The President of the United States and Congress committed billions of dollars to structuring a "National Strategy for Homeland Security" (Office of Homeland Security, 2002) geared toward fighting terrorism at the federal level by enlisting the help of state and local agencies.

At the local level of government, LEAs throughout the U.S. continue to explore various strategies for preventing future attacks and preparing for the possibility of having to respond to large-scale terrorist incidents within their jurisdictions. In doing so, these agencies have initiated various plans and programs ranging from training their personnel to respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents to intertwining antiterrorism initiatives with their community policing programs.

Although these agencies are motivated by similar objectives of combating terrorism, the wide array of antiterrorism programs initiated throughout the Nation has created confusion as to which programs are most effective. Furthermore, the increase in local law enforcement homeland security responsibility has created a situation where these agencies rely on their respective states and the federal government for additional guidance and support. Therefore, the

plethora of programs and indistinguishable lines of state and federal support point to finding answers to the following questions:

1. Have local LEAs constructed antiterrorism programs that provide both effective prevention and incident response strategies while ensuring these strategies are in line with the National Strategy for Homeland Security?
2. Are individual states and the federal government adequately supporting local law enforcement homeland security initiatives?

Literature Review

Before discussing individual programs, it is most appropriate to study previous literature concerning the evolution of the federal homeland security program and the goals and objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This review also seeks to provide insight concerning available information local LEAs utilize in order to formulate their individual anti-terrorism programs. Although not all-encompassing, the following review provides a look at the major milestones in building the Nation's homeland security program along with a comprehensive examination of expert recommendations and resources available for creating effective antiterrorism programs at the local level.

Federal Homeland Security Evolution

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, well before September 11, 2001, many Americans were concerned about the danger of terrorists attacking the U.S. homeland. Government administrators took several steps to provide a safer environment but they never really mobilized a demonstrative effort to create "preventative measures designed to enhance the security of the United States" (Peterson, 2003, p. 5). As White (2003) posits, one of the main questions confusing the homeland security debate is, "[W]hen should terrorism be handled as a criminal matter, and when should it fall under the heading of national defense?" (p. 299). Before September 11, 2001, most Americans believed terrorism was a national defense issue and thus: generally disapproved of extensive efforts at domestic security. They were willing to staff and bankroll defense and intelligence communities to contain the Soviet Union and to deal with conflicts 'over there,' but the quid pro quo was supposed to allow civilians at home to enjoy the full extent of their accustomed freedoms. (Flynn, 2004, p. 2)

Therefore, attempts to construct adequate homeland security policies were not met with much enthusiasm. For example, in 1999, President Clinton “chose to ignore the warnings of the bipartisan Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security in the 21st Century” (Peterson, 2003, p. 6). Upon providing its predictions in the first of three phases of reports, the Commission stated:

America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not protect us...States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers. (Cilluffo, Collins, Borchgrave, Goure’ & Horowitz, 2000, p. 2)

The Hart-Rudman Commission recognized that the evolving terrorist threat against the homeland called for drastic changes in how the federal government was structured. As the foundation of what we now know as the present-day U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Commission recommended “the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security” (U.S. Department of State, 2001, para. 6).

Furthermore, in its *Second Annual Report, Toward a National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, issued in 2000, the Gilmore Commission reiterated the concerns of Hart-Rudman by stating:

The United States has no coherent, functional national strategy for combating terrorism...[and] the organization of the Federal government’s programs is fragmented,

uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable (as cited in RAND, 2002, The Gilmore Commission section, para. 1).

Therefore, this commission also recommended the establishment of a senior level organization that would have the responsibility of coordinating both foreign and domestic counterterrorism activities and would be responsible for the “development of a national strategy” for combating terrorism (RAND, The Gilmore Commission section, para. 1).

Other professionals went further by concentrating on defining the elements of a national antiterrorism strategy. For example, in 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism felt that the Department of Defense may have to take the lead role during a large-scale attack on the homeland. Therefore, the Commission recommended that, “[T]he Secretary of Defense should establish a unified command structure that would integrate all catastrophic terrorism capabilities and conduct detailed planning and exercises with relevant federal, state, and local authorities” (U.S. Congress, 2000, p. 40). Although partially agreeing that the notion of expanding the military’s homeland security role made sense, members from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) explained that state and local officials will “primarily be in charge” during a terrorist attack on the homeland. Therefore, they recommended that the federal government establish plans and policies in order to support state and local officials (Cilluffo et al, 2000, p. 6). To further drive home their point, Cilluffo et al, quoted former New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman as she testified on Capitol Hill concerning homeland security. Upon quoting Whitman, Cilluffo et al, wrote:

As is true so often...it comes back to governors to manage the fallout, literally or figuratively, of any kind of terrorist attack...We are the ones along with our mayors and our local government officials, who actually must deal with people. It is fine to deal with

the theory, and we want to be part of that process, but ultimately, we are the ones who are responsible for dealing with the people. (p. 6)

By the end of 2000, the U.S. Administration and Congress were deeply concerned with the state of the Nation's homeland security strategy and thus, they initiated plans to strengthen it.

In January 2001, the U.S. published its Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN). The CONPLAN was:

designed to provide overall guidance to Federal, State and local agencies concerning how the Federal government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (MWD). (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2001, p. iii)

As White (2004), points out, although the plan established the relationship between six federal agencies² and explained the primary responsibilities of each, it “did nothing to establish a federal-state-local structure”(p. 81) nor did it address plans to prevent terrorist attacks.

Therefore, in line with the federal government's actions, most state and local agencies dedicated the majority of their antiterrorism resources toward responding to a terrorist attack instead of concentrating on preventing one.

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, state and local LEAs scrambled to find ways to protect their jurisdictions while hundreds of government officials, think tanks, organizations, professional associations, and private companies were there to provide myriad suggestions. At the same time, the federal government was swiftly shifting gears from a reactive to a much more proactive stance concerning homeland security.

² As White (2004) points out, the six agencies include: the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency.

In formulating its international response, the U.S. government actively designed strategies in order to “preempt terrorist attacks that might otherwise occur” (Peterson, 2003, p. 12). Coinciding with its international actions, the U.S. also utilized this “preemptive” stance in order to strengthen the federal government’s homeland security strategies.

In an attempt to bolster the Nation’s counterterrorism mission, the U.S. established the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001. The mandate of the new Office of Homeland Security involved “efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States” (as cited in RAND, 2002, The Homeland Security Office section, para. 1). However, as the RAND organization explains, this mandate was “somewhat ambiguous concerning whether the office’s coordinating responsibilities extend to the activities of state and local government agencies” (The Homeland Security Office section, para. 1). Therefore, state and local governments were again left to decipher on their own, what exactly this office would be able to do to help them establish effective antiterrorism programs.

Also in October 2001, the President signed into law the USA PATRIOT Act³ which gave federal law enforcement officers increased intelligence gathering and search and seizure authority over international terrorists and clandestine foreign intelligence activities. Along with its enactment, came great disagreement concerning the legality and effectiveness of some portions of the USA PATRIOT Act.

As Kayyem (2003), posits, USA PATRIOT Act “critics were concerned that in a rush to pass the legislation, too much authority was being offered to the government with too few checks” (p.39). While others contend that although it provided federal officers with increased

³ Acronym for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT).”

intelligence gathering authority, the USA PATRIOT Act fell short in the process of developing the role of state and local agencies (White, 2004).

Further recognizing the need to define roles and responsibilities and strengthen the information-flow between federal, state and local LEAs, the Heritage Foundation's Homeland Security Task Force, identified top priorities in their *Defending the American Homeland* report. Among other recommendations, this task force identified the following items as priorities for improving the ability of LEAs and the intelligence community to work together at protecting the homeland:

- Rapidly improve information-gathering capabilities at all levels of government. For Federal, State and Local law enforcement officials, a first line of defense against terrorism and other threats to the homeland is access to timely, reliable, and actionable information from both foreign and domestic sources.
- Improve intelligence and information sharing among all levels of government with homeland security responsibilities...Federal funding and training should be targeted to assist State and Local LEA [law enforcement agency] information-gathering efforts. (The Heritage Foundation, 2002a, pp. 6-7)

The Heritage Foundation (2002a) also provided key inputs on ways to strengthen "civil defense against terrorism" (p. 31). First, its task force issued a priority calling for the development of a "terrorism response checklist and a manual of civil defense exercises to guide officials in assessing preparedness" so that state and local agencies could identify their weaknesses and improve on them "based on national standards" (The Heritage Foundation, p. 32). The task force felt that this priority would further enhance the coordination between the three levels of government when faced with a terrorist incident.

Secondly, The Heritage Foundation (2002a) recommended that all levels of government “have a program in place that informs the public about terrorist threats and civil defense plans in order to mitigate fear and build support for their efforts” (p. 33). Taking these and other recommendations into account, the Office of Homeland Security, (later to be renamed the U.S. Department of Homeland Security), set out on establishing the first-ever National Strategy for Homeland Security.

National Strategy for Homeland Security

The main objective of the National Strategy for Homeland Security venture was to create “a comprehensive and shared vision of how best to achieve” the goal of protecting the homeland (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, President Bush’s preceding letter to My Fellow Americans, para.3).

Viewed as the “big-picture” upon which to organize for securing the homeland, the National Strategy for Homeland Security has three basic objectives:

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
- Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and
- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 3)

To meet these objectives, the strategy calls for mobilizing the entire Nation by recognizing “the crucial role of state and local governments, private institutions, and the American people in securing the homeland” (Office of Homeland Security, p. 3). The strategy identifies several critical mission areas to include: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protection of critical infrastructures and key assets, defense against catastrophic threats and emergency preparedness and response (Office of Homeland Security).

Although the Strategy identifies critical missions, it does not outline the actual processes upon which they can be accomplished. Therefore, state and local LEAs are left with trying to formulate their own particular antiterrorism programs based on their own understanding of how best to accomplish these missions. However, since the inception of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the federal government has taken a few vital steps toward formulating an overall collective approach in order to meet the strategy's objectives.

For example, on May 1, 2003, the federal government's Terrorist Threat Intelligence Center (TTIC) opened its doors for business. This center, as explained by its Director, John O. Brennan, as he testified before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, is a "multi-agency entity [that] has access to information systems and databases spanning the intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic, and military communities that contain information related to the threat of international terrorism" (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2004, para, 6). The TTIC's key objectives involve sharing and analyzing various forms of information from a variety of sources in an effort to provide senior government officials the most up-to-date, accurate picture of the terrorist threat upon the Nation. Furthermore, the TTIC seeks to expand its information sharing capabilities in order to "enhance the ability of DHS and FBI to make more terrorism-related material available to state and local government officials, law enforcement entities, and the private sector" (CIA, para. 8).

Further extending its collaboration and information sharing efforts, the federal government expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) throughout the Nation. As its counterterrorism website explains, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI established a total of 66 JTTFs throughout the country. With one located in each of the 56 FBI main field offices and in ten of the FBI's smaller offices, these JTTFs consist of "teams

of state and local law enforcement officers, FBI agents, and other federal agents and personnel who work shoulder-to-shoulder to investigate and prevent acts of terrorism.” Thus, as the FBI puts it, “these task forces are important ‘force multipliers’” (FBI, n.d., para. 2).

In addition to the preventative measures discussed above, the federal government has also made great strides in formulating a plan to meet the National Strategy for Homeland Security’s objective of minimizing and recovering from an attack. For example, per the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the DHS developed the Initial National Response Plan (INRP). This plan, dated September 30, 2003, “lays the groundwork for revolutionary changes in the federal response to terrorism, major disasters and other emergencies” (Regen, 2003, para. 2). As an “initial” plan, the INRP is the federal government’s first step in combining a collection of federal plans into a single, comprehensive domestic incident management approach. As Regen explains, the final version of the National Response Plan (NRP) will ultimately:

- Integrate all federal domestic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into a single all-discipline, all-hazards plan.
- Implement a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to ensure federal, state and local governments can work together during a disaster.
- Treat crisis management and consequences management as a single, integrated function that covers the entire life cycle of an event.
- Improve cooperation among federal, state, local, private sector and nongovernmental (NGO) organizations.
- Give a single agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the lead role in crisis management. (para. 2)

While these objectives sound rather inviting, the road to seeing them through to fruition is long. For instance, as it stands, the NRP is supposed to be developed so that it supersedes such plans as the Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), the National Oil and Hazardous Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), the Mass Migration Response Plans, and both, FEMA's Federal Response Plan (FRP) and its Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FERP). In doing so, the NRP will have to somehow address the problem of combining these unique plans into one. Issues such as the plans' varying demands regarding funding, equipment, training and logistics must be considered (Regan, 2003).

In addition to dealing with the issues of combining the federal plans, the NRP must also be written in a manner that supports standardization of emergency response actions at the state and local level. Nevertheless, as Regen (2003) explains:

[t]he plan's ultimate goal is to harmonize and standardize as many operating procedures as possible so that everyone – from large federal and state agencies to the county sheriff and local volunteer firefighters - uses the same incident command structure, speaks the same terminology and works with interoperable equipment. (Order in the House section, para. 3)

In the meantime though, local LEAs continue to seek guidance through various avenues on ways to appropriately formulate effective antiterrorism programs.

Creating Effective Antiterrorism Programs at the Local Level

Upon reporting the results of a survey administered to local governments, police and fire officials and other "front-line" workers, The Democratic Task Force on Homeland Security (2003), stated that the survey's respondents:

made it clear that the dialogue, or lack thereof, between the federal government and American's [sic] hometowns about how to prevent terrorism in our communities is another gaping hole in the defense of the homeland. (p.3)

Although partisan politics may have something to do with the above statement's conclusion, there is considerable evidence to support the notion that the vast majority of LEAs are in need of assistance regarding the creation of effective antiterrorism programs within their jurisdictions. Recommendations concerning how to best formulate an effective local law enforcement antiterrorism program span the spectrum of thought. Therefore, in the attempt to consolidate ideas and logically present the information, this review is divided into five areas: funding, threat assessments, training, intelligence gathering and information sharing, and equipment.

funding.

There are many factors that influence a LEA's decisions regarding the administration of its antiterrorism program. That said, "funding" is by far, the one aspect that impacts antiterrorism programming the most. LEAs base antiterrorism program administration decisions, such as, the number of personnel assigned to manage the program, the amount and type of training needed and the type of equipment to purchase, not only on the amount of funding but also on the type of funding available. With this in mind, most LEAs don't have the financial means to adequately support their antiterrorism initiatives alone. Therefore, local LEAs must look to the higher levels of government for assistance.

Referring back to The Democratic Task Force on Homeland Security (2003) survey, 87% of the 304 respondents related they did not have adequate funding for their homeland security needs. Currently though, President Bush's FY 2005 budget proposal includes more than \$30 billion for homeland security, a 9.7% increase over fiscal year 2004 homeland security funding

(Washington, 2004). However, as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) (2004) explains:

State and local law enforcement assistance programs did not fare well in the proposed budget. Overall, funding levels for assistance programs that are primarily designed to assist state and local law enforcement agencies were reduced by \$1.455 billion when compared to FY 2004. (p. 1)

A portion of this reduction impacts the three primary federal programs that local LEAs rely upon to fund their antiterrorism efforts.

Administered through an agency within the DHS called the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the three primary federal programs that dole out funds in support of local LEA antiterrorism efforts are: The State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSG), the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP) and the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) (IACP, 2004). The monies distributed from the SHSG program and the LETPP flow through the state level governments, who in turn, must provide 80% of the funding to the local levels of government. Funding from the UASI program is earmarked for certain urban areas that are “chosen by the Department of Homeland Security based on a formula that takes into account factors including critical infrastructure, population density and credible threat information” (IACP, 2004, p. 3).

Although UASI funding is specifically directed toward assisting selected urban areas, the majority of other federal homeland security assistance seems to be getting bogged down at the state level (Miller, 2004). For instance, upon reporting the results of a survey administered to 30 randomly selected local LEAs, Sharp (2004) quoted Captain Cloyd Grove of the Great Falls, MT, Police Department as saying:

I am extremely skeptical about the current funding mechanism. It seems that no one talked to local agencies prior to establishing the procedure. It would be interesting to have all funds tracked to see what percentage really gets to local entities. (para. 29)

Echoing these sentiments, Miller (2004) cites Charles Lyons, the president of the National League of Cities, who declared, “[f]or the smaller communities the biggest complaint is that [the money] doesn’t get to them. When, a terrorist attacks, people call 911, they don’t call the White House, or the governor’s mansion” (para. 15).

Adding to the funding dilemma, Sharp (2004) further explains that current federal homeland security assistance programs stifle local LEAs’ ability to efficiently administer their antiterrorism programs. As Sharp contends, federal homeland security funding:

must be spent on specialized equipment that might be needed for specific events, like chemical or biological attacks. Nevertheless, agencies are acquiring an array of equipment that might or might not come in handy at some point. (para. 31)

The inflexibility associated with the federal homeland security grants facilitates waste of critical funding that could be spent in a much more practical and efficient manner. Nevertheless, officials seem to be taking action in order to address these particular funding issues.

For example, DHS Director Tom Ridge established a Task Force on State and Local Homeland Security Funding. In its final report, the task force identified, among other things, the following recommendations:

- Amend the federal grant regulations to allow grantees more flexibility in expending administrative funds.
- Establish national standards for grant management including terminology and real-time tracking capabilities.

- Where applicable, encourage state and local governments to alter legislative and procurement procedures to accept and expend homeland security funds on a more expedited basis. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2004, p. 3)

In addition to these recommended improvements, another way local LEAs can reduce future mismanagement and waste is by allocating scarce antiterrorism resources based on the results of a comprehensive threat assessment.

threat assessments.

Local law enforcement antiterrorism planning must begin with an assessment of the threat environment. As the IACP (n.d.) explains, “[R]educing a community’s vulnerability to attack requires, among other things, analyzing a locality to identify likely targets and working to improve security at these locations” (p. 8). The IACP recommends that agencies “assign an officer or a unit” to the task of conducting this threat assessment. Others contend that in order to accurately assess a community’s vulnerabilities, experts from various government agencies and possibly, private companies must be involved (Beering, 2003). Thus, although law enforcement officers may be able to identify vulnerabilities associated with highly-populated areas or various critical facilities, they may not have the required expertise to readily identify vulnerabilities of items such as, water treatment plants or vital communications links. Having said that, the question remains: how does a LEA conduct a threat assessment?

Upon providing their recommendation of “[A]ssess the threat to your jurisdiction” to governors and mayors, The Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University explained that an “Assessment and Strategy Development Tool Kit, which was developed by the Department of Justice (through the Office

for Domestic Preparedness, Office of Justice Programs)” is available to facilitate this process (Pangi, 2001, p. 1). Originally established in FY 1999, the State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy (SHSAS) tool kit was created so that state and local jurisdictions could “assess threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and needs related to preparedness for weapons of mass destruction terrorism incidents” (Office of Domestic Preparedness, n.d., p. v).

Information gleaned from these assessments provides the basis upon which jurisdictions can effectively prepare to meet the threat. As Pangi posits, “[e]very jurisdiction should set goals by which to assess its state of readiness. These goals will help set benchmarks by which to determine how much preparedness is enough and establish priorities to meet that level” (p. 1).

Furthermore, upon reviewing guidance from the State of North Carolina, local LEAs within the state can also request a instrument that the Governor’s Anti-Terrorism Taskforce developed in order to assist them in determining threats and vulnerabilities within their jurisdictions (North Carolina’s Safety and Security website, Governor’s Anti-Terrorism Taskforce, n.d.).

training.

Closely related to an antiterrorism program’s threat assessment process is the training of department personnel. Most experts recognize that training is a “starting point” for initiating “counterterrorist operations” (White, 2004, p. 64). With this in mind, local LEAs seek to acquire the most effective training for their personnel. Whether the training includes both terrorism prevention and “first responder” actions is simply up to the particular agency, and hopefully, based on the priorities established in their threat assessment. However, as White (2004) explains, the type of training and of whom within the agency receives the training is a complicated matter.

For example, while citing Taylor (2002), White (2004), explains that training police officers in proactive counterterrorist measures “may cross the line from investigating violent activity to intelligence gathering about political action” (p.67). Others contend that counterterrorism training is better suited for specialized teams⁴ of officers dedicated to resolving “situations that regular police officers may not be trained to handle, or may not be within the scope of their job responsibilities” (Clark, Jackson, Schaefer & Sharpe, 2000, p. 407). On the contrary, as Kulish (2002) points out, regular police officers are the ones who are likely have contact with terrorists. Kulish writes:

it was an ordinary Florida traffic cop who pulled over – but never suspected – a speeding Mohamed Atta in July 2001, before the Sept. 11 attacks. Federal agents using complex sleuthing techniques didn’t catch Timothy McVeigh: a local cop stopped the Oklahoma City bomber shortly after the explosion for driving without a rear license plate. And in December 1999, customs inspectors at the Canadian border with Washington state foiled Ahmed Ressam, the so-called millennium bomber. (para. 5)

Therefore, some posit that police officers, and in particular, patrol officers need training that develops their “abilities to recognize potential terrorist situations during routine field contacts” (White, 2004, p. 64). Nevertheless, the majority of the focus regarding antiterrorism training is found within the realm of incident response and recovery operations.

Reflecting upon “first responder” training, most would agree that local law enforcement officers must be prepared to initially handle a terrorist incident (IACP, n.d.; Office of Homeland Security, 2002; White, 2004). Thus, in order to properly train their personnel, local LEAs continue to seek out the appropriate training needed. However, the vast amount of training

⁴ For example, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Units. Also known by other names such as Special Response Teams (SRTs) Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) and Emergency Service Units (ESUs) (Clark et al, 2000).

offered through both government agencies and private companies makes it difficult to determine which training is best. With this dilemma in mind, many are propagating that the federal government should establish basic “first responder” training guidelines for local LEAs. For instance, The Heritage Foundation (2002b) suggests that police officers, along with firefighters and emergency medical teams, “need more and better coordinated federal training to ensure the nation is adequately prepared for a terrorist attack using chemical, biological or radiological weapons” (para. 1). While Seigle (2002) contends that “[A] national training standard should be established and maintained by the federal government for first responders who are poorly prepared and equipped to recognize or respond to a weapon of mass destruction attack” (para. 1).

Although training is a major component of an agency’s overall antiterrorism program, another important aspect involves the agency’s ability to gather and share intelligence.

intelligence gathering and information sharing.

As the IACP (n.d.) points out, local LEAs’ antiterrorism preparation “should include thinking strategically about how to gather and process intelligence” (p. 7). The IACP posits that “[t]he best prevention against terrorist acts at the local and state level is to maintain an ongoing intelligence-gathering and –coordinating enterprise with state and federal agencies” (p. 7). For example, this strategy may include coordination between the LEA and other law enforcement or intelligence entities such as, TTIC personnel, one of the FBI’s JTTFs and/or the state’s antiterrorism program coordinator.

Others contend that one of the best ways to formulate an aggressive antiterrorism plan is to “engage” the community. Consequently, these experts suggest that local LEAs link anti-terrorism initiatives with community policing programs (Pangi, 2001; Scheider & Chapman, 2004). Further extending this concept, some experts explain that the success of an agency’s anti-

terrorism program depends upon cooperation of the community's citizens. As Jenkins (2004) explains:

[I]f homeland security is to succeed, it needs to involve Americans in the defense of their communities, neighborhoods and families. In countries dealing with on-going terrorist campaigns, such as Israel and the United Kingdom, the authorities depend on public vigilance. With proper instruction, the entire United States can be turned into a vast neighborhood watch—a difficult environment for terrorists. (p. 97)

While many express the importance of enlisting the help of community members, others feel that antiterrorism strategies should primarily revolve around the exploitation of technologically advanced intelligence gathering and information sharing capabilities (England, 2003).

As White (2004) explains, “[d]espite the limitations on intelligence gathering, it is possible for law enforcement to gather information, store it in an analytical database and share it with other officers” (p. 69). White provides examples of intelligence systems within the U.S. that show great promise in combating terrorism. For example, the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center (CATIC) “attempts to process multiple sources of information to predict threats.” Rather than just being “an information gathering” tool, this statewide system actually seeks to analyze past information in order to produce future threat assessments (White, pp.70-71). Furthermore, as Rood (2004) explains, the Joint Regional Exchange System (JRIES), “launched in the wake of 9/11” not only connects local LEAs with each other, it also provides them the opportunity to “receive unclassified intelligence analysis from the Pentagon or DHS” (Comfort Factor section, para. 6).

In addition to the newly created systems, an older criminal information network regularly used by LEAs, known as the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) which is linked to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC), is currently being used to compile information regarding suspected terrorists (O'Connor, n.d.).

While reflecting upon the benefits of utilizing these various information networking systems, LEAs must also keep in mind potential pitfalls associated with sharing sensitive terrorist threat information. For instance, CATIC administrators have recently come under scrutiny for allowing the dissemination of warnings titled "Terrorist Advisory." The warnings revealed information regarding the actions of a group of "peaceful anti-war protestors" and therefore, in the minds of some, crossed the proverbial line of collecting intelligence on a legitimate political group (Rood, 2004, Reports on Protestors section, paras. 1-2).

equipment.

Building upon this notion of advanced technologies, Croft (2004) explains that current tools found in various U.S. military contracts can be "repackaged" for use in homeland security. Items such as sophisticated command and control vehicles, intrusion detection systems, camera surveillance, early warning sensors and access denial systems are just a few of the available technologies that have applicability in homeland security.

Furthermore, law enforcement agencies must also decide upon other equipment needed for their antiterrorism programs. For example, in order to respond to and operate in a WMD attack area, LEAs must supply their officers with personal protective equipment (PPE). In addition, some agencies may feel the need to invest in a variety of other terrorism prevention and incident response equipment to include information analysis software, explosive mitigation equipment, detection devices and physical security enhancement equipment, just to name a few.

Thus, in an attempt to the assist LEAs, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, (2002) produced a *Guide for the Selection of Personal Protective Equipment for Emergency First Responders, Volumes I-IV*. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2003), also provides suggestions on equipment selection in their *Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, Volume I: Overview and Doctrine*.

Although “first responder” equipment is recognized as a “must have” so that officers can respond to, and survive WMD incidents, (Keating, 2004; White, 2004), the key to picking the appropriate equipment stems from an agency’s initial assessment of their threat environment and their level of training.

Upon reviewing the totality of literature concerning homeland security, an examination of ten North Carolina local LEAs’ anti-terrorism programs may shed light on how these organizations successfully transform this enormous amount of information into manageable programs.

Method

Research Sample

One way of finding answers to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper is to examine and compare local law enforcement antiterrorism programs in relation to the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Therefore, a sampling of ten local LEAs within the state of North Carolina was chosen for this research. Comprising some of the largest local LEAs in the state to some of the smallest, this sampling of ten municipal agencies was selected through the use of purposive sampling. These ten agencies were selected based on the criteria of maintaining sample diversity regarding size of population within the agencies' jurisdictions, size of the agencies themselves, their geographical locations within the state and the inclusion of some jurisdictions that contain potentially high-threat terrorist targets, for example, military bases, ports of entry (sea and/or air), large public gathering structures, nuclear power plants and/or other critical infrastructure facilities. Furthermore, as with most studies conducted using purposive sampling, the willingness of the agencies to cooperate with the researcher was also a major factor in selecting them for this project (Hagan, 2003).

In order to select the appropriate sample, the researcher first had to analyze the populations of North Carolina's 547 different municipalities. After obtaining North Carolina's 2002 Municipal Population Estimates from the State's demographics website (<http://demog.state.nc.us/>), the researcher utilized Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software in order to compare population sizes of these jurisdictions. Table 1 displays data obtained from these comparisons.

Category	Population (in thousands)	# of Municipalities (N)	% of Total N
1	0 to 10	481	87.9
2	10 to 20	31	5.7
3	20 to 30	14	2.6
4	30 to 70	11	2.0
5	70-100	3	0.6
6	100 to < 600	7	1.2

Table 1. Population Size within North Carolina Municipalities.

As Table 1 reveals, the vast majority (87.9 % or N = 481) of the 547 municipalities in North Carolina have populations of less than 10,000. However, if 87.9% of the research sample was selected from these smaller jurisdictions, the study would most likely lack important aspects associated with creating antiterrorism strategies within densely populated areas of the state. Furthermore, a closer look at the State's demographics reveals that over 50% of North Carolinians live within the jurisdictions that fall within categories 5 and 6 above. Therefore, two agencies from category 1, one agency from category 2, three agencies from categories 3 and 4 combined, one agency from category 5, and three agencies from category 6 were included in the sample.

The next step in the process of selecting the sample was to explore agencies within these categories that fit the criteria regarding size of the agency itself and geographical location. As for the size of the agency, the researcher found that in most cases, the size of the agencies corresponded to their population size and therefore was not a factor that needed to be considered separate of the population size criteria. Regarding geographical location, however, agencies were selected for inclusion in the sample based on dividing the state into four sectors. Figure 1 provides the basis of how the state was divided. Of the ten participating agencies, two are located in sector 1, three are located in sector 2, three are located in sector 3 and two are located in sector 4 of the state.




Figure 1. Map of North Carolina Divided Into Four Research Sectors.

The next step in selecting the research sample was to ascertain which of the municipalities meeting the population size and geographical criteria also contained high-threat terrorist targets. To determine which municipalities to include in the sample, the researcher reviewed various sources of information regarding the State's military installations, ports of entry, power plants and large public gathering facilities. Then at least one agency in each section of the state was selected for inclusion based on the presence of at least one of these perceived high-threat terrorist targets.

Finally, the last step in selecting the research sample involved contacting the various agencies and requesting their participation in the study. For the most part, this step went very

smoothly, however, the researcher found a couple of agencies that did not want to be involved in the study. Although no specific reason for denial was given, one may assume that these agencies were skeptical regarding the release of information concerning potentially sensitive antiterrorism strategies and/or their lack of maintaining an antiterrorism program at all.

Data Gathering

First and foremost, the objective of this research was to obtain information from a sample of agencies within North Carolina in order to gauge the effectiveness of antiterrorism strategies at the local law enforcement level. In order to do so, without revealing sensitive law enforcement plans and procedures within a particular area, study participants had to remain anonymous. Thus, the researcher utilized a data collection process whereby individual agency information was protected and solely analyzed by the researcher involved in this study. Furthermore, an “informed consent” form (see Appendix 1) was utilized in order facilitate understanding between the researcher and study participants as to their individual and combined responsibilities regarding the research.

Upon contacting the participating municipalities, the researcher first obtained approval from the head of the agency and then set up a meeting with department personnel who were most involved in administering the antiterrorism program. These individuals usually held the rank of captain, lieutenant or sergeant within the organization.

In order to maintain uniformity amongst the ten agencies, the researcher developed an interview outline (see Appendix 2) which covered antiterrorism program administration, training, intelligence gathering/information sharing, daily operations, and intergovernmental relations and communications. This format enabled the researcher to maintain standardization in gathering specific data regarding the agencies’ antiterrorism programs. While at the same time, the format

provided flexibility allowing the ten different agencies to expound upon their own particular experiences and jurisdictional issues.

Data Analysis

The qualitative data obtained from these interviews were analyzed in both discrete and aggregate form in order to reveal effective strategies for combating terrorism and to assess the amount of state and federal support accessible to local law enforcement antiterrorism initiatives within North Carolina. The results of this analysis are contained within this report.

Results and Discussion

Over the past few months, personnel from 10 LEAs throughout North Carolina have graciously provided the author insight concerning their respective antiterrorism programs. An analysis of the data received from these individuals is best presented by breaking down the discussion into four areas: program administration, training and exercises, intelligence gathering and information sharing and daily operations. In addition, upon interviewing each agency's personnel, the author attempted to gauge the effectiveness of each program and its association with the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Furthermore, this research was helpful in uncovering the amount of state and federal support provided to local LEA antiterrorism programs within North Carolina.

Research Sample General Information

The sample of agencies involved in this research represent less than 2% of the number of municipal LEAs within North Carolina. However, the diversity associated with the research sample provides quite an accurate representation of all LEAs within North Carolina. Of the 10 agencies, some have over 500 sworn officers assigned while others have less than ten. The populations range from hundreds of thousands to less than 1,500 people living within their jurisdictions. In addition, some of the agencies are responsible for protecting or at least assisting in the protection of potentially high-terrorist threat targets such as, air and sea ports, military installations, nuclear power plants, large chemical manufacturing companies and critical infrastructure to include water, electric and telecommunications facilities. On the other hand, some of the agencies in the sample are merely responsible for protecting their jurisdictions' business and residential areas.

In line with the amount of diversity in agency demographics and responsibilities, the attitudes of individual interviewees and the procedures regarding antiterrorism within their agencies also span the spectrum from extremely engaged to indifferent. For example, when asked about changes to their antiterrorism efforts after 9/11, some identified that there were fundamental shifts in attitudes regarding their agency's role in homeland security while others simply replied that no changes had taken place. As one program administrator explained, "[s]ince 9/11, we've changed our entire attitude. We now focus our efforts toward intelligence led policing." Another revealed that "[a]lthough there was more of a realization that it could happen here, we really didn't change much." Overall though, the majority of the participants expressed that 9/11 facilitated a heightened sense of responsibility among their agencies regarding involvement in both preventing and responding to terrorist attacks on the homeland. Thus, an analysis of these agencies' antiterrorism efforts illustrates how this heightened sense of responsibility is put into practice.

Program Administration

Administering an antiterrorism program involves three key areas of concern. These areas include personnel, planning and funding.

personnel.

Of the 10 agencies, only 3 have one or more officers permanently assigned to manage their antiterrorism program. Not surprising, these agencies are the three largest (all have over 250 sworn officers assigned) within the research sample. The duties of these permanently assigned officers include such things as: assessing potential terrorist threats, creating written plans, gathering and disseminating intelligence, procuring funding, orchestrating training and advising leadership on proper courses of action.

Two of the agencies that maintain permanently assigned antiterrorism officers have formed “intelligence units.” Both of these units have made great strides in establishing relationships with various federal and state law enforcement and intelligence officials in order to obtain a clear threat picture of their particular jurisdiction and the surrounding areas.

In addition to the three agencies with permanently assigned officers, there are two other agencies within the sample that task a specific individual with administering their antiterrorism programs. However, these individuals also perform other key agency functions that have no connection to their antiterrorism program responsibilities. For example, a captain who is in charge of his agency’s overall budget, accreditation program and training is also tasked with administering the department’s entire antiterrorism program. Therefore, without the benefit of having permanently assigned assistants, this individual has to find ways to creatively spread his energy over all aspects of his duties. In doing so, as the captain acknowledged, the agency’s antiterrorism program suffers greatly from the lack of time to manage it.

The remaining five agencies have not assigned antiterrorism duties to any one particular person. For the most part, these agencies run their programs in sort of a “piece meal” fashion. One officer may be tasked with establishing antiterrorism training for the department while another is responsible for procuring specialized personal protective equipment. In the mean time, a different officer is given the responsibility of collecting terrorist threat information for dissemination throughout the agency. While this type of program administration may seem to be effective, what one finds is that when there is little internal collaboration on the part of these officers, the agency’s overall antiterrorism approach suffers due to improper planning.

planning.

As mentioned in the literature review of this paper, accomplishing a local threat assessment is critical to creating an effective antiterrorism plan. Therefore, an analysis of the participating efforts regarding threat assessments is in order.

In an attempt to assist the ODP in their quest to properly allocate homeland security funds, the federal government mandated that every state assess the needs (and threat) of their local jurisdictions. Concluding in December 2003, the State of North Carolina completed a “comprehensive risk, capabilities and needs assessment” for all 100 counties within the state (State of North Carolina, 2004, p. 4). According to the State, results of these assessments “provided the necessary data to outline the state’s requirements, as well as the needs and shortfalls of individual jurisdictions” (p. 4). Nevertheless, the degree to which local LEAs were involved in this process is unclear. For example, although all of but 1 of the 10 agencies contacted acknowledged involvement in the 2003 state assessment, only 1 agency seemed to be familiar with the results regarding their particular jurisdiction. The other agencies stated that they were neither provided a copy nor informed of the assessment’s results.

As for accomplishing local “in-house” threat assessments for their jurisdictions, 4 of the 10 agencies revealed that their departments had done so. One agency in particular has innovatively bolstered its threat assessment capabilities by enlisting the help of its patrol officers. The agency is currently in the process of training patrol officers to conduct “site assessments.” These site assessments, which cover such things as critical infrastructure facilities, schools, municipal buildings and other potential terrorist targets are conducted in coordination with the selected facilities’ personnel. Results of these assessments are not only provided to the selected

facilities' managers but also to the law enforcement agency's antiterrorism planning division so that they can be included into the municipality's overall threat assessment.

The overall state regarding antiterrorism plans amongst the ten agencies is grim. Although every agency has some form of "emergency response" type plan, only one agency maintains antiterrorism plans that outline strategies associated with the preventative aspects of combating terrorism. For example, only one of the ten agencies produced a written plan that stipulated how terrorist intelligence information is gathered and/or disseminated. Furthermore, the same agency was the only one that confirmed the presence of a written policy associated with how their personnel are supposed to up-channel suspicious terrorist activity within their jurisdiction. However, even in the absence of written plans, most of the personnel interviewed could adequately articulate how they perceived these actions would be accomplished. The difficulty of "uniformity" remains though.

Without written plans to guide them, personnel have a tendency to discharge duties in various ways depending upon their experience and education. Based on this assumption, it is not unreasonable to assume that there will be serious inconsistencies in the manner upon which agency personnel approach their antiterrorism duties. More importantly, in the absence of written guidance, the financial requirements associated with antiterrorism programming are indefinable.

funding.

Undoubtedly, the most difficult part of researching local LEA antiterrorism programs is the funding aspect. No two agencies are the same regarding how much their program costs, from where they receive funding or how they spend their antiterrorism program funds. Having said

that, upon analyzing the data, a few important matters emerge concerning the overall picture of local LEA antiterrorism program funding.

First, although there is great diversity regarding the type and amounts of grants, all of the 10 agencies have received some form of federal or state antiterrorism program assistance. Some received grants earmarked to augment their antiterrorism training efforts while others received funding to assist them in rectifying their inoperable communications issues. Others though, did not receive direct financial assistance, but rather, were supplied equipment that had been purchased by other governmental entities on their behalf.

In spite of all this, every agency still complained that the additional assistance received was simply not enough to cover the cost associated with executing effective antiterrorism programs within their jurisdictions. The agencies conveyed a variety of antiterrorism funding concerns.

For example, as a member of one agency explained, his department was notified that it would be receiving \$120K in federal assistance. However, six months later, the funding prospect fizzled away thereby successfully dashing his plans to increase the amount of antiterrorism training offered to patrol officers. Another expressed concern about the lopsidedness regarding homeland security funding granted to fire departments and other emergency response entities as apposed to police agencies. The interviewee expressed what he felt was a mistake on the part of government administrators to direct the majority of homeland security funding toward emergency response and recovery instead of recognizing the importance of the prevention aspects.

Adding to the concern of not enough financial assistance from the federal and state governments, another funding matter involves local LEAs accurately identifying their

antiterrorism program costs. Take for example the results of an interview conducted with one of the larger agencies in the sample. After explaining to the researcher that their agency received approximately \$250K in FY 03/04 through a State of North Carolina homeland security grant for officer overtime and training, members of the agency still considered “not enough money” as being their biggest obstacle for their antiterrorism program. However, when questioned by the researcher regarding how much money was needed, the members had difficulty supplying an approximate dollar amount let alone a specific one.

More often than not, agency personnel were unable to gauge the cost of their antiterrorism efforts. Only 1 of the 10 agencies had actually conducted an “impact study” to determine the costs associated with their antiterrorism program. Simply put, the other agencies had not formulated a means to measure financial needs associated with their antiterrorism programs.

In a final analysis of the 10 agencies’ antiterrorism “program administration” areas, although all of them are keeping pace with the emergency preparedness and response objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, most are just starting to make headway of meeting the strategy’s prevention goals. However, this slow start may be attributed to the lack of guidance provided by the state and federal governments. Although the National Strategy stipulates prevention goals, it provides no guidance on how to attain these goals. Nevertheless, there are four key points that local LEAs should take away from this analysis:

1. Agencies should strive to assign ample permanently assigned personnel to antiterrorism programs in order to promote effective administration.

2. Agencies should highly consider conducting local threat assessments and establish plans detailing not only emergency preparedness, but also, prevention and intervention actions.
3. Agencies should conduct a cost analysis of their antiterrorism programs.
4. Agencies should seek out funding from various sources and spread the funding out across the full spectrum of the program, from prevention to incident recovery.

Training and Exercising

Along the same lines as “program administration,” antiterrorism training efforts amongst the 10 agencies can best be described as “varied.” However, a “varied” approach does not always indicate an ineffective effort.

Upon reviewing the data associated with antiterrorism training, all 10 agencies have supplied their personnel with some form of “first responder” training. Some have completed the U.S. Department of Justice’s (USDOJ’s) Emergency Response to Terrorism, Law Enforcement Response to WMD Incidents training in addition to the USDOJ’s Public Works: Preparing for and Responding to Terrorism/WMD training. Others have received the Domestic Preparedness training developed by the U.S. Army Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center in 1998. Furthermore, some of the agencies’ personnel have attended training concerning “suicide bombers” which was provided by the North Carolina Army National Guard. Lastly, venturing into the non-governmental sector, 1 agency sent approximately 10 of its officers to Louisiana State University in order to attend their Law Enforcement Response to WMD training.

On the other hand, the number of agencies attending formal antiterrorism “prevention” training is much smaller. For example, only 3 of the 10 agencies indicated that they had sent personnel to training sessions geared toward educating attendees on terrorism prevention

strategies. Topics such as, methods of target hardening, terrorism indicators/threat recognition and group ideologies were some of the subjects covered in these training sessions. Nevertheless, of the remaining 7 agencies, 4 of them revealed that their prevention-type antiterrorism training is conducted “in-house” usually during “role-calls.”⁵ However, ascertaining to what extent this training is based on sound principles is difficult to judge due to the lack of written training materials and plans.

Another important aspect that goes hand-in-hand with antiterrorism training is the concept of “exercising.” Antiterrorism exercises are rather important because they provide agencies the opportunity to examine their antiterrorism capabilities in a non-threatening environment. The two most common types of antiterrorism exercises are: table-top and actual response exercises.

A table-top exercise is conducted just exactly in a manner as its name states—on a table top. These exercises usually involve bringing all the key players together in one area in order to run through a simulated scenario. Individual key players review their particular role in the scenario and explain to the rest of the group what their actions would be. The extent to which the scenario plays out is up to the imagination of the personnel involved. The advantages of conducting table-top exercises include such things as the ability to gauge how antiterrorism plans will/will not work without having to actually interrupt the actual operation of the jurisdiction’s emergency response agencies and the lives of the civilian community.

On the other hand, table-top exercises sometimes fail to portray the actual capabilities of the key players involved. Therefore, an “actual response” exercise is most likely the best way to truly evaluate these capabilities. Of course, the major disadvantages of conducting an actual

⁵ “Role-call” is a term used to describe the time, usually approximately 30 minutes long, when officers arrive for duty and are briefed by their leadership concerning items such as, daily assignments, local threats and training

response exercise are exactly opposite of the advantages regarding table-top exercises. In the end though, no matter which type of exercise is conducted, pre-exercise planning is the key.

Reflecting back upon the data obtained from the research sample, 6 of the 10 agencies revealed that they had been involved in one or more antiterrorism table-top exercises since September 11, 2001, while only 4 of the 10 agencies had conducted an actual response type antiterrorism exercise during the same period.

Most of the reported exercise scenarios consisted of an attack involving the use of a WMD on the jurisdictions' potential high-threat targets. These exercises were conducted in collaboration with a number of other emergency response entities within the region. For example, in 2003, working alongside their county's Emergency Operations Center (EOC), one of the agencies was involved in a multi-jurisdiction WMD exercise that included approximately 600 personnel from various federal, state and local agencies. By requiring actual responses, this exercise enabled the department to examine the effectiveness of their prior training. What's more, through its "after-action" report, the exercise helped uncover certain areas needing improvement.

Upon completing the analysis of the antiterrorism "training and exercising" areas, it again seems that emergency response aspects of the program are favored over that of prevention and intervention. Reflecting back upon this paper's literature review, White (2004) explained that selecting the proper antiterrorism training and selecting who within the department will receive the training is a complicated matter. However, the key points to take away from this discussion are:

1. Departments should select training that is geared toward achieving the goals established in the department's antiterrorism plans.

2. Departments should budget for the training.
3. And most importantly, departments must exercise the plans to ensure the training is effective.

As a side note, White (2004) recommends that local LEAs utilize the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program that was developed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. White goes on to explain that this training “contains general information for operational personnel, specialized investigative training, and executive workshops” (p. 64). The SLATT program is an excellent, affordable way of providing generalized prevention and intervention training for all department personnel.

Intelligence Gathering and Information Sharing

Local LEAs understand the importance of gathering intelligence about criminals, but, intelligence concerning terrorism is a rather new concept for these agencies. As discussed earlier, intelligence gathering and sharing is a touchy subject when it comes to civil liberties and therefore many local LEAs have ventured into this arena very slowly. Most have only made it to the point of creating downward flowing, one-way communication links between their agency and those of state and federal law enforcement.

An examination of the 10 agencies’ intelligence gathering and information sharing systems revealed some interesting items. First, some were very fortunate to have a close relationship with police and intelligence officials from local military installations while others maintained relations with the FBI through membership on the JTTF. Through avenues such as these, agencies have the ability to gather a great deal of real-time information concerning the local terrorist threat. However, not all agencies have (or utilize) these luxuries. Of the 10 agencies interviewed, only 3 maintain a formal partnership with either a JTTF or some other

higher level intelligence gathering entity. The remaining 7 agencies rely upon intermittent personal contact with a variety of state and federal criminal or intelligence sources. Also, these agencies collect intelligence messages delivered through various electronic means, such as, e-mail and data terminal messages from the FBI's daily threat bulletins, DHS, LEO and NCIC, just to name a few.

As for information sharing techniques employed by the 10 agencies, most use simple avenues of communication to inform their personnel of incoming terrorist threat warnings and information. For instance, a means used by every agency is the typical "roll call briefing." Upon information being filtered down through the chain of command, patrol officers are informed, usually by their sergeant or lieutenant, of the warnings and additional information in the face-to-face "roll call" setting.

In addition to utilizing roll calls, half of the agencies reported using e-mail and/or mobile data terminals to inform their officers. However, some terrorist threat information is not suited for transmission over unsecured methods and therefore, some agencies prefer to use antiquated methods such as, "read files" and "bulletin board" postings. Nevertheless, 1 of the 10 agencies revealed its unrelenting determination to keep its officers well informed regarding the terrorism threat.

This agency not only utilizes the various means of communicating electronically, but also, their intelligence unit convenes a weekly terrorism threat meeting with the agency's supervision. During this meeting, participants have the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the issues at hand. Consequently, these meetings cultivate increased interest in the agency's antiterrorism program and facilitate a stronger sense of teamwork amongst agency personnel.

Another important aspect of “information sharing” entails the process by which information flows upward within the agency and then outward from the agency. In most of the agencies interviewed, this aspect seems to be lacking some important parts. First, as discussed earlier, only 1 agency could produce written procedures for their officers to follow regarding reporting suspicious activity possibly related to terrorism. Furthermore, even in the agency that did maintain written procedures, personnel expressed great concern regarding how the receiving agency handled their terrorist threat information. For example, the personnel interviewed explained that communication flow between their agency and the officials at the higher levels of government generally maintains a one-way direction. Thus, even though local LEAs continue to push information up-ward, more often than not, they never receive the required feedback needed to establish an effective local terrorist threat picture.

While most local LEAs understand the importance of gathering and sharing terrorist threat information, what is revealed by this analysis is that these agencies need additional guidance with regard to establishing a formal structure upon which this information should flow. Terrorist intelligence gathering and information sharing are considered to be two of the most complicated issues for local law enforcement agencies. The National Strategy for Homeland Security states various goals for improving these systems but provides no concrete direction as to what actions these agencies should take. However, a good starting point for any local LEA would be to examine some of the current systems being utilized throughout the U.S.

As White (2004) explained, there are several system around the country that show great promise in collecting and sharing terrorist intelligence information between federal, state and local LEAs. These include the CATIC, the New Jersey State Police Intelligence Service’s system and New York City’s intelligence unit. Although these systems may not be exactly what

a particular agency needs, they do provide possible insight as to how local LEAs can improve their existing systems.

Daily Operations

Daily operations include such things as antiterrorism community policing efforts and actions taken when the U.S. increases the Homeland Security Advisory System's (HSAS's) level.

Of the 10 agencies interviewed, 7 have tied their antiterrorism efforts into their community policing programs in some way or another. For instance, some utilize their neighborhood watch programs as an avenue to discuss their agency's antiterrorism efforts with the civilian community. Others seek to establish a rapport with certain community groups, such as school officials, critical infrastructure facility employees and other professional organizations in order to bolster their agencies' antiterrorism efforts.

One agency in particular has identified a specific concern within the community that is directly associated with their close proximity to a military installation. As this agency's personnel explained, community members feel that if terrorists wanted to destroy the morale of military members deploying overseas, all they would have to do is attack the military members' families left behind in the area. Therefore, this agency strives to maintain open communications in order to inform community members on the department's antiterrorism programs. This includes such things as informational briefings and personal safety talks with various organizations and community groups. Furthermore, their officers working the streets are encouraged to communicate with the public in order to gather the community's perceptions of the local threat.

Another agency has a different approach in connecting antiterrorism with community policing. This particular agency is structured in a way that allows its sector commanders flexibility in their community policing programs. These commanders establish programs based on their understanding of their individual community's needs. Then, these commanders call upon the agency's antiterrorism personnel to perform various public relations functions within their communities. For example, as the agency's antiterrorism personnel explained, their unit has conducted training sessions with organizations concerning suspicious package recognition and reporting instructions. Furthermore, this antiterrorism unit interacts with the public during Community Action Councils. These councils, one of which operates in every police sector, provide an opportunity to discuss the department's antiterrorism efforts and the community's concerns about terrorism. These councils also provide an avenue for educating the public on the HSAS.

Per Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3), the HSAS was implemented in March 2002. Since its inception, the HSAS has created great debate regarding the actions local LEAs should take in order to counter these increased threats. This analysis of actions taken by the 10 agencies within the research sample continues this debate.

The HSAS, although voluntary at the local level of government, "is intended to create a common vocabulary, context, and structure for an ongoing national discussion about the nature of the threats that confront the homeland and the appropriate measures that should be taken in response" (The White House, 2002, para. 2). However, it's troubling to local LEAs regarding the amount of non-reimbursable resources they must expend every time the HSAS level is increased. Therefore, LEAs tend to first assess if there are any specific threats to their jurisdiction before executing increased countermeasures.

In regards to an overall reaction to the HSAS, all research participants revealed that there was some form of “heightened awareness” within their agencies during increased levels, however, transforming this awareness into action was inconsistent throughout the agencies.

For instance, only 2 of the 10 agencies revealed that they implement additional actions whenever the national HSAS level is increased. Six of the remaining agencies reported that they initially conduct an assessment of the local threat and if warranted, they implement additional countermeasures. One of the remaining 2 agencies explained that they had never considered implementing additional measures during periods of increased HSAS levels. Likewise, members of the last remaining agency revealed that their agency did not follow the national HSAS, but instead, had formulated its own terrorist threat advisory system. Furthermore, these individuals rationalized the agency’s decision to go it alone by explaining that a non-specific (as far as location is concerned) national advisory did not justify the amount of resources it took to implement effective counterterrorism measures throughout their jurisdiction.

This analysis of daily anti-terrorism operations reveals how the differences between communities and the differences between department structures play an important role in determining a particular agency’s actions. Although their approaches may be different from one another, the fact remains that the majority of these LEAs are managing to connect antiterrorism activities with their community policing programs. This is important because if the public is educated about the agency’s antiterrorism efforts, they are much more likely to feel empowered to identify and report suspicious activities within their communities (Scheider & Chapman, 2004).

As for the departments’ actions during increases in the HSAS level, although some may feel this system is flawed, it’s currently, the only system we have. Thus, LEAs must make every

effort to acknowledge these threats by maintaining the capability to implement an increased counterterrorism posture.

Federal and State Support

A review of the amount of antiterrorism program support within these 10 agencies provided by the federal and state governments reveals the complexity of the problem of combating a national issue at the local level. Although these local LEAs are granted some additional funding and offered a variety of emergency response training through the higher levels of government, the two themes that stand out from this analysis are “lack of direction” and “lack of continuity” from the higher levels of government.

The individuals interviewed for this research seem to feel that without a clear direction from the federal and state governments, an attempt to formulate their antiterrorism programs based on the goals of the National Strategy for Homeland Security is too vague of a concept. This belief leads to the creation of local antiterrorism programs based solely on the assumed requirements for their particular communities. Simply put, most local LEAs find themselves formulating their antiterrorism programs totally isolated from any other entity outside their jurisdictions.

Who’s in charge of what? Where do we go for help in this area? What level of government is supposed to pay for this portion of the program? How do we receive funding? All of these questions are ones local LEAs are asking due to the lack of continuity in administering the Nation’s and State’s programs.

Nevertheless, the areas of intergovernmental support and continuity in antiterrorism program planning and administration are experiencing improvements.

In its *2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism*, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), explained that the FY 2004 funding requests represented an increase of 83% over the FY 2002 expenditures. A portion (28%) of the increase was geared toward enhancing the intergovernmental relations between federal, state and local LEAs in the areas of intelligence gathering and sharing information, counterterrorism and emergency response to terrorist attacks (OMB, 2003).

Having said that, the overall formulation of the Nation's antiterrorism program structure is far from being finished. Hence, a significant feature that local LEAs should take away from this analysis is the importance of increased "education." In other words, in order to understand how the state and federal government can support their antiterrorism efforts, LEAs must strive to familiarize themselves regarding available resources. All too often local LEAs are quick to accuse the higher levels of government of non-support without first investing some time and energy into seeking out existing aid.

Furthermore, local LEAs should also keep in mind that as the Nation progresses down the antiterrorism programming path, a vast amount of effective homeland security practices will be formulated within their own agencies. Therefore, it's also imperative local LEAs continuously share their experiences and ideas with one another.

Recommendations for Future Antiterrorism Program Research

As with completing any research project, there are always portions that one looks back on and determines that a different approach may have been more effective. This project is no different. Therefore, the following recommendations are made to anyone planning to conduct research involving local LEA antiterrorism programs.

First, although the outline utilized in this project helped to guide the interview process, it may have relied too much on the participants' subjectivity rather than impartiality. Therefore, future interview outlines should be devised in a manner that can control for this phenomenon. In addition, the interview outline for this project contained a variety of items that, in retrospect, did not contribute to the overall representation of an antiterrorism program. Thus, future researchers should spend an ample amount of time planning specific data gathering goals so that unnecessary items are not incorporated into their interview outlines.

In addition to formulating a proper outline, future research that seeks to assess the association between local LEAs antiterrorism programs and the National Strategy for Homeland Security should attempt to include a sampling of local LEAs situated throughout the Nation. Furthermore, additional information regarding the states' antiterrorism strategies should be included in the assessment so that all levels of government are fairly represented.

Lastly, future antiterrorism program researchers should seek to devise their projects in a manner not limited by anonymity. By doing so, information regarding individual agency "best practices" can be disseminated to others in a much more useful manner.

Conclusion

The expansion of potential terrorist targets within the U.S. has facilitated dramatic changes in antiterrorism planning throughout the Nation. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, federal, state and local LEAs expeditiously formulated antiterrorism programs with the intentions of preventing and/or facilitating successful recovery from an attack on our homeland.

The task of creating and administering these programs has involved a variety of issues. The federal government realized that in order to be effective in protecting the homeland, it had to consolidate and reorganize many of its departments. At the same time, state and local governments were looking to the federal government for direction in achieving the Nation's antiterrorism objectives. These agencies quickly came to realize that they had to formulate their programs based exclusively on their own experience and available resources. In doing so, local LEAs merely created programs tailored to their own particular community needs without much concern about the objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

Now, approximately three years after the September 11, 2001, attacks, there seems to be a greater push for emphasizing federal direction and increased antiterrorism program continuity across all levels of government. This much needed push will most likely have a positive impact on local law enforcement's ability to assist in accomplishing the Nation's homeland security objectives. In the final analysis, these accomplishments, however, are far from being realized.

References:

- Beerling, P. S. (2003). Assessing infrastructure vulnerability and security. In J. N. Kayyem & R. L. Pangi (Eds.), *First to arrive: State and local response to terrorism*. (pp. 21-38). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. (n.d.). Significant terrorist attacks against the United States and its citizens 1946-2001. Retrieved February 7, 2004, from <http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/101/timeline.html>
- Central Intelligence Agency. (2004, April 14). Written statement for the record of John O. Brennan, Director, Terrorist Threat Integration Center on law enforcement and the intelligence community before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Retrieved July 15, 2004, from http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/041401brennan.html
- Cilluffo, F., Collins, J. J., Borchgrave, A. D., Goure', D. & Horowitz, M. (2000). Defending America in the 21st Century: New challenges, new organizations, and new polices. Retrieved November 13, 2003, from <http://www.CSIS.org/Homeland/>
- Clark, J. G., Jackson, M. S., Schaefer, P. M. & Sharpe, E. G. (2000). Training SWAT teams: Implications for improving tactical units. [Electronic version]. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 28, 407-413.
- Croft, J. (2004). Aerospace giants repackage military technology for home. In T. J. Brady (Ed), *Homeland Security 04/05, 1st edition*. (pp.117-119). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.
- England, G. (2003, August). Intelligence sharing is 'critical.' [Electronic version]. *Community Links*, 1-2.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). War on terrorism, counterterrorism: Partnerships.

Retrieved July 16, 2004, from <http://www.fbi.gov//terrorinfo/counterterrorism/partnership.htm>

Federal Emergency Management Agency (2001). United States government interagency domestic terrorism concept of operations plan (CONPLAN). Retrieved February 8, 2004, from <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/conplan/conplan.pdf>

Flynn, S. E. (2004). America the vulnerable. In T. J. Brady (Ed), *Homeland Security 04/05, 1st edition*. (pp.2-8). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.

Hagan, F. E. (2003). Research methods in criminal justice and criminology, sixth edition. Boston, MA: Pearson Education, Inc.

International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2004, February). Impact of the proposed FY 2005 budget on state & local law enforcement assistance programs. Retrieved July 19, 2004, from <http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/WhatsNew/ACFA0D3%2Epdf>

International Association of Chiefs of Police. (n.d.). Leading from the front: Law enforcement's role in combating and preparing for domestic terrorism. Retrieved February 8, 2004, from <http://www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/terrorism%2Epdf>

Jenkins, B. M. (2004). All citizens now first responders. In T. J. Brady (Ed), *Homeland Security 04/05, 1st edition*. (p.97). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.

Kayyem, J. N. (2003). In defense of the law. In J. N. Kayyem & R. L. Pangi (Eds.), *First to arrive: State and local response to terrorism*. (pp. 39-46). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

Kayyem, J. N. & Pangi, R. L. (2003). First to arrive: State and local response to terrorism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

- Keating, F. (2004). Catastrophic Terrorism—local response to a national threat. In T. J. Brady (Ed), *Homeland Security 04/05, 1st edition*. (pp.76-81). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.
- Kulish, N. (2002, August 30). Local police are enlisted to fight terror. *The Wall Street Journal*. (Eastern Edition). p. B1. (ProQuest ID No. 156544681)
- Miller, S. B. (2004, March 29). Homeland security at the grass-roots level; Concerns raised by Boston residents typify nationwide challenges of terror response. *Christian Science Monitor*. p. 3. (ProQuest ID No. 591385851)
- North Carolina's Safety and Security website, Governor's Anti-Terrorism Taskforce. (n.d.). Governor's terrorism preparedness task force: Summary of actions. Retrieved February 10, 2004, from http://www.ncgov.asp/subpages/task_force_summary.asp
- O'Connor, T. (n.d.). The integration of homeland security and law enforcement. Retrieved July 21, 2004, from <http://faculty.ncwc.edu/TOConnor/427/427lect07.htm>
- Office of Domestic Preparedness. (n.d.). State homeland security assessment and strategy: Jurisdiction handbook. Retrieved July 24, 2004, from http://www.shsasresources.com/documents/Jurisdiction_Handbook.pdf
- Office of Homeland Security. (2002). National strategy for homeland security. Retrieved February 07, 2004, from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/>
- Office of Management and Budget. (2003). 2003 report to Congress on combating terrorism. Retrieved March 1, 2004, from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2003_combat_terr.pdf
- Pangi, R. (2001, November). Preparing for terrorism: What governors and mayors should do. [Electronic version] *Perspectives on Preparedness*. 5, 1-5.

- Peterson, P. (2003). While America slept. In *American Government in a changed world: The effects of September 11, 2001*. (pp. 3-22). New York: Pearson Education.
- RAND. (2002). Issue paper: Organizing for homeland security. Retrieved February 8, 2004, from <http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP220/IP220/index.html>
- Regen, S. (2003, December 17). The new national response plan: Homeland security takes an initial step. *Occupational Hazards*. Retrieved July 19, 2004, from <http://www.responder-safety.net/printout.php?EID=11095>
- Rood, J. (2004, July 6). Pentagon has access to local police intelligence through Office of Homeland Security Department. *CQ Homeland Security*. Retrieved July 21, 2004, from <http://homelandandsecurity.osu.edu/focusareas/infosharing.html>
- Scheider, M. C. & Chapman, R. (2004). Community policing and terrorism. In T. J. Brady (Ed), *Homeland Security 04/05, 1st edition*. (pp.98-102). Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin.
- Seigle, G. (2002, March 6). 'First responders' to terrorism seek federal strategy, equipment. *GovExec.com*. Retrieved February 10, 2004, from <http://www.govexec.com/news/index>
- Sharp, A. (2003, October). Training, funding and equipment. *Law & Order*, 51(10), 178. (ProQuest ID No. 466272221)
- State of North Carolina. (2004). State homeland security strategy, 2004-2006. Retrieved July 27, 2004, from [http://www.dem.dcc.state.nc.us/HomelandSecurity/Library/State%20Strategy%20\(2003\).pdf](http://www.dem.dcc.state.nc.us/HomelandSecurity/Library/State%20Strategy%20(2003).pdf)
- The Democratic Task Force on Homeland Security. (2003, October 29). Federal homeland security assistance to America's hometowns: A survey and report from the Democratic Task Force on Homeland Security. Retrieved November 12, 2003, from <http://www.house.gov/etheridge/NationalHomelandSurvey.pdf>

The Heritage Foundation. (2002a). Defending the American homeland: A report of the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task Force. Retrieved February 8, 2004, from

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfmPageID=9713>

The Heritage Foundation (2002b). Feds must train “first responders” in more organized manner, analysts say. Retrieved February 10, 2004, from [http://www.heritage.org/Press/](http://www.heritage.org/Press/NewsReleasees/NR051402.cfm?RenderforPrint=1)

[NewsReleasees/NR051402.cfm?RenderforPrint=1](http://www.heritage.org/Press/NewsReleasees/NR051402.cfm?RenderforPrint=1)

The White House. (2002). Homeland security presidential directive-3. Retrieved July 26, 2004, from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020312-5.html>

U.S. Congress. (2000). Countering the changing threat of international terrorism: Report of the National Commission on Terrorism. Retrieved February 8, 2004, from <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html>

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2003). Homeland security exercise and evaluation program, volume I: Overview and doctrine. [NCJ199536]. Retrieved February 10, 2004, from www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Homeland Security Advisory Council. (2004, June). A report from the task force on state and local homeland security funding. Retrieved July 20, 2004, from <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/HSAC-FundingTaskForceRpt0604-FINAL.pdf>

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. (2002). Guide for the selection of personal protective equipment for emergency first responders, NIJ Guide 102-00 Volume I. Retrieved February 9, 2004, from <http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/nij/191518.pdf>

U.S. Department of State. (2001). Executive summary of U.S. Commission on National Security report. Retrieved February 8, 2004, from <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01013102.htm>

Washington, W. (2004, January 23). Bush seeks more money for security. *The Boston Globe*. p. A2. (LexisNexis[TM] Academic)

White, J. R. (2003). Terrorism: An introduction, 4th edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

White, J. R. (2004). Defending the homeland: Domestic intelligence, law enforcement, and security. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Appendix 1: Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent

Title of Study: Protecting the Homeland at the Local Level: An Assessment of Local Law Enforcement Antiterrorism Programs in North Carolina.

Principle Investigator: John M. Newton, Graduate Student

Institution: East Carolina University, Criminal Justice Department

Address: 212 Ragsdale Hall, Greenville, NC 27858

Introduction:

I have been asked to help in a research study being conducted by John M. Newton.

This research is designed to: assess local law enforcement antiterrorism programs within North Carolina with the goal of identifying effective strategies for combating terrorism and assessing the amount of state and federal support provided to local law enforcement antiterrorism initiatives.

Plan and Procedure:

My help will require me to have a meeting with John M. Newton and answer questions concerning my agency's antiterrorism program. This meeting will take place within my agency's facility at a location I determine to be best suited for discussing my agency's antiterrorism program. Furthermore, in addition to answering questions at the meeting, I may be asked to answer follow-up questions in order to clarify information discussed at the initial meeting.

Risks and discomforts:

I may be nervous when I answer questions. Sometimes people experience discomfort when discussing information regarding their occupation. The researcher will answer any questions I have and explain how my answers will be used in the study.

Potential Benefits:

My help in this research will assist antiterrorism program administrators and policy analysts with determining appropriate strategies for formulating effective antiterrorism programs at the local level of government.

Termination of Participation:

I may choose, at any time during the study, to not answer certain questions or stop my participation all together. Furthermore, I understand that my decision to terminate participation or not answer questions will not be disclosed to anyone.

Costs and Compensation:

There are no costs associated with this study nor is there any form of compensation.

Confidentiality:

Results of this study will not be shared either in speeches or written papers in any way that could directly or indirectly identify me, my agency, and therefore, my confidentiality will be protected. Information collected by the principle investigator will be kept at his residence in a locked desk drawer. Any computer generated information will be maintained on the principle investigator's password protected personal computer located at his residence. Only the principle investigator will have access to the information. After the study is completed, the principle investigator will destroy all written notes that have identifying information on them and will delete all computer-generated files containing identifying information.

Voluntary Participation

I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary. I may stop participating at any time I choose without fear that my decision will be discussed with anyone, to include my superiors.

Persons to contact with Questions:

The principle investigator will be available to answer questions concerning this research, now or in the future. I may contact the principle investigator, John M. Newton, at (XXX) XXX-XXXX. In addition, I may contact this study's East Carolina University faculty advisor, Dr. Mark Jones, at (XXX) XXX-XXXX.

Consent to Participate:

I certify that I have read all of the above, asked questions and received answers concerning areas I did not understand, and have received satisfactory answers to these questions. I willingly give my consent for participation in this research study. (A copy of this consent form will be given to the person signing as the subject and a copy will be maintained by the principle investigator.

Participant's Name and Agency (PRINT)

Participant's Signature

Principle Investigator's Name (PRINT)

Principle Investigators Signature

Appendix 2: Interview Outline

Antiterrorism Program Interview Outline

Title of Study: Protecting the Homeland at the Local Level: An Assessment of Local Law Enforcement Antiterrorism Programs in North Carolina.

Principle Investigator:

John M. Newton
Graduate Student, Criminal Justice Department
East Carolina University

Faculty Advisor:

Dr. Mark Jones, Associate Professor
Criminal Justice Department
East Carolina University

Project: The aim of this project is to personally interview antiterrorism (AT) program managers for ten different local law enforcement agencies located in North Carolina in order to evaluate their preparations and strategies for combating terrorism. The principle investigator seeks to assess various aspects of an agency's overall strategy to include: program administration, training, intelligence gathering and information sharing, daily operations, and intergovernmental relations and communication. Furthermore, additional information may be obtained based on the project participants' desire to include supplementary details of their particular antiterrorism program.

Research Areas:

Program administration:

Actions before 9/11, changes after

Personnel

- Permanently assigned to manage program
- Special response teams

Funding

- Amounts spent on AT. (officer overtime, training, equipment, technology, etc..)
 - in 2001
 - in 2002
 - in 2003
 - in 2004 (Projected)

- Where funding is derived
 - Fed and state grants? (type and amounts)
- Budget of City/County
- Budget of Police/Sheriff Department
- Financial Impact of AT increases on department

Equipment (WMD or other)

Vulnerability assessments

- Date accomplished
- In house/outside agency
- Mandated

AT written plans (Type of plan(s)/date(s) implemented)

Training:

Federal guidance/assistance

State guidance/assistance

In-house training

Types of training and who receives it

- Prevention
- Emergency Response
- Other

Exercises [joint, in-house]

Intelligence Gathering/Information Sharing.

Intelligence gathering techniques and locations from where it is received

Information sharing and dissemination techniques

Daily Operations.

Community Programs – community policing, public perception if known

Media/Public Relations Notifications

Actions during increases in National Terrorist Threat Advisory

Intergovernmental relations and communication

Strategic Plans

Guidance from Federal or State officials

Communications- before and during an incident – things that worked well/problems

Association with Emergency Operations Centers/Disaster Response Command Centers

Task Force participation

Other law enforcement agencies within and around your jurisdiction you can call upon for assistance

AT response Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) with other agencies

Other Considerations:

Biggest threat to jurisdiction

Biggest Obstacle for AT program

Terrorism scenario most planned for

Affects of USA Patriot Act.(positive/negative)

Things you would like to see in the future

Any other proposals or comments concerning your AT program